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211945Z Apr 00

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3109

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
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	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/010W

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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5809
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
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AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LUANDA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
STATE PASS DOD FOR OSD/PKHA/JSCHEAR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [CG](#) [ZI](#)
SUBJECT: S/E WOLPE DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND
DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD, REASONS 1.5
(B), (D)

REFS: A) HARARE 2102, B) HARARE 2103

1. (C) SUMMARY: ZIMBABWEAN JUSTICE MINISTER AND
MUGABE CONFIDANT STATES THAT THE VICTORIA FALLS
MEETING WAS CALLED IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES
TO CONTINUED FORWARD PROGRESS THAT MIGHT HAVE
RESULTED FROM CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS SINCE THE RECENT
KAMPALA AGREEMENT. ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, HE ASSERTS,
ARE PARTICULARLY EAGER TO FIND A QUICK EXIT FROM THE
DRC, BUT CAN DO SO ONLY IF IT IS CLEAR THAT UGANDA
AND RWANDA ARE ALSO WITHDRAWING. HE REPORTS THAT,
AFTER BEING APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE
HAD INITIATED CONVERSATIONS WITH THE EX-
FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT THEIR RESETTLEMENT IN THE
INTERIOR OF THE DRC. HOWEVER, THIS INITIATIVE WAS
HALTED WHEN KABILA LEARNED OF IT AND POSED STRONG
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PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
OBJECTIONS. ZIMBABWE FEELS IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID
A RUPTURE WITH KABILA, AND BELIEVES THAT DDRR ISSUES
WILL BE EASIER TO ADDRESS ONCE MONUC IS DEPLOYED ON
THE GROUND AND IF THERE IS BROADER INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT. HE ARGUES THAT THESE ISSUES ARE MORE
EASILY PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, AND URGES THAT THE
USG INTENSIFY ITS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, PARTICULARLY
BETWEEN KINSHASA AND HARARE. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND OF THE VIC FALLS MEETING

2. (C) : ON APRIL 21 S/E WOLPE, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD,
LT. COL. GADDIS AND ECONOFF NOTETAKER MET WITH
EMERSON MNANGAGWA, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF
PRESIDENT MUGABE, TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE CONGO AND THE EXECUTION OF THE LUSAKA PEACE
ACCORD. IN A NEARLY 90 MINUTE-LONG MEETING, THE

JUSTICE MINISTER COVERED CONSIDERABLE GROUND, AND OFFERED PARTICULARLY CANDID OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE AND ZIMBABWE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH KABILA.

13. (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT ZIMBABWE HAD BECOME VERY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED ON THE GROUND SINCE THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE/DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. THE VARIOUS PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS AND CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS HAD RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMMITMENT BY THOSE INVOLVED, AND THERE WERE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 01 OF 05 212004Z
SUSPICIONS THAT SOME SIDES STILL SOUGHT MILITARY GAINS. ZIMBABWE FEARED THAT EVENTS MIGHT BE SPINNING OUT OF CONTROL.

14. (C) MNANGAGWA SAID THAT IT WAS MUSEVENI WHO HAD SUGGESTED THE VICTORIA FALLS MEETING, AND WHO HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DELIVER KAGAME. MUGABE AND NUJOMA HAD PROMISED TO DELIVER DOS SANTOS, WITH KABILA ALSO INVITED. THE IDEA WAS TO HAVE "AN INFORMAL, NON-BINDING SETTING" IN WHICH THE LEADERS MIGHT REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES THAT HAD EMERGED AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENTS THAT HAD OCCURRED OVER THE PAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS. THE ZIMBABWEANS INTENDED TO PRESS FOR A RENEWED SENSE OF COMMITMENT TO DISENGAGEMENT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL; TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH THE TWO SIDES COULD "VOLUNTARILY MOVE BACKWARD" IN THE SPIRIT OF COMMITMENT TO THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT; AND TO FIND A METHOD OF INSURING THAT AGREEMENTS MADE WERE HONORED. IF THE LEADERS "SEE LIGHT," THEY WILL THEN BRIEF CHILUBA. MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS FOR A PULLBACK. (ANGOLA, HE SAID, HAD VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND WAS NO LONGER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.) HE BELIEVED

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CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3112

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
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	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
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P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5810
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
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AMEMBASSY LUANDA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
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PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
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DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

THAT UGANDA WOULD POSE NO FURTHER PROBLEMS IN MOVING TO DISENGAGE THE FORCES ON THE GROUND, BUT HE WAS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RWANDA.

15. (C) ACCORDING TO THE JUSTICE MINISTER, MBEKI AND CHISSANO WERE COMING TO VIC FALLS FOR A DIFFERENT REASON: TO DISCUSS ZIMBABWE'S LAND QUESTION. MBEKI,

HE SAID, HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT HE NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE INFORMAL CONGO DISCUSSIONS.

WHAT TO DO WITH NON-STATE ACTORS

16. (C) AFTER PRAISING ZIMBABWE'S LEADERSHIP IN SECURING THE RECENT KAMPALA AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURING THE JUSTICE MINISTER THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF CONGOLESE SOVEREIGNTY AND
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, S/E WOLPE BROACHED THE KNOTTY PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE NON-STATE ACTORS. HE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER IF IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA BY BOLD MOVES ON BOTH SIDES: A DEEPER DISENGAGEMENT AND PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, LINKED TO UNDERTAKINGS BY THE GDRC AND ITS ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NON-SIGNATORY FORCES. WHAT DID ZIMBABWE FEEL IT COULD DO THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE RWANDA AND UGANDA TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING?

17. (C) MNANGAGWA RESPONDED FRANKLY THAT THE GOZ HAD NOT YET DEVELOPED CONCRETE POSITIONS ON DDRR, BUT ZIMBABWE DID RECOGNIZE THIS WAS THE CRUCIAL QUESTION. HE SAID THAT TWO MONTHS AGO, AFTER BEING QUIETLY APPROACHED BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, ZIMBABWE GAVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO ZIMBABWE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN WITH THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE. HE DISCOVERED THAT THE LARGEST PART OF THEM WANTED TO SETTLE IN THE DRC. THE ZIMBABWEANS THEN ASKED THE HUTU FIGHTERS IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DISARMAMENT. IN THE ZIMBABWEAN VIEW, A SOLUTION WAS IN SIGHT: IF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ELEMENTS WERE TO SETTLE IN THE DRC, THEY WOULD NOT/NOT BE ON THE BORDER BUT IN THE INTERIOR; THEREFORE, THEY WOULD NO LONGER POSE A THREAT TO RWANDA OR BURUNDI.

18. (C) HOWEVER, THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONTINUED, THE DRC LEARNED OF THE ZIMBABWEAN INITIATIVE AND KABILA
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 02 OF 05 212004Z
HAD REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY. THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD THEREFORE TURNED OFF THIS ATTEMPT AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE PROBLEM. THE ZIMBABWEAN IMMEDIATE GOAL, HE SAID, WAS "TO MAXIMIZE ZIMBABWEAN INFLUENCE ON KABILA, RATHER THAN ON THESE FORCES." "WE NEED TO PLAY A ROLE THAT IS APPRECIATED BY KABILA," HE SAID, "SO WE CAN PUSH HIM TO TAKE POSITIONS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY." ZIMBABWE HAD CONCLUDED THAT, GIVEN KABILA'S OPPOSITION TO ANY SUCH DISCUSSION, PUSHING THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ISSUE AT THIS POINT WOULD BE VERY COSTLY IN TERMS OF THE BIGGER PICTURE. (IN AN ASIDE, THE JUSTICE MINISTER OBLIQUELY REFERENCED SOME DISCUSSIONS THE DRC HAD HAD WITH THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE ABOUT HOW THEIR DEMANDS COULD BE ADDRESSED. HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THESE ELEMENTS AND EITHER UGANDA OR RWANDA.)

19. (C) MNANGAGWA AGREED THAT THE DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION HAD TO BE RESOLVED IF LUSAKA WERE TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED. BUT, HE SAID, ZIMBABWE COULD NOT BE IN THE LEAD OR SEEN AS THE CHAMPION OF THIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3113

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
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	L-00	AC-01	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PA-00
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P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5811
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
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DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

INITIATIVE. RATHER, ZIMBABWE WANTED TO SEE MORE
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS INVOLVED. ONCE MONUC DEPLOYED,
ZIMBABWE WOULD BE LESS SIGNIFICANT AND LESS VISIBLE,
AND IT WOULD BE EASIER TO WORK THE DDRR ISSUES. IT
WOULD ALSO BE EASIER TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULT DDRR
ISSUES IF THEY WERE PRESSED BY THIRD PARTIES, HE
SAID.

10. (C) WOLPE OBSERVED, WITH THE JUSTICE MINISTER'S
CONCURRENCE, THAT KABILA DID IN FACT APPEAR TO
RESPOND TO STRONG PRESSURE. WHY, THEN, WAS ZIMBABWE
RELUCTANT TO EXERT THE SAME PRESSURE ON KABILA ON THE
DISARMAMENT ISSUE THAT IT HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE KAMPALA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT?
MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A CORE ISSUE FOR
KABILA, AND ZIMBABWEANS FEARED THE CONSEQUENCES IF
THEY PUSHED KABILA TOO FAR. KABILA WAS ALREADY
SHOPPING AROUND FOR OTHERS TO FILL THE ZIMBABWEAN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z
ROLE, AND THAT HAD MADE THE GOZ EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS.
WOLPE NOTED THAT ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT KABILA HAD
PURCHASED HAD DONE LITTLE TO IMPROVE KABILA'S
POSITION, AND THAT HE REMAINED DEPENDENT ON THE
ZIMBABWEAN ARMY. MNANGAGWA SAID THAT, WHILE THIS
MIGHT BE TRUE, KABILA COULD PROVIDE MORE SIGNIFICANT
ARMS TO THE NON-SIGNATORY FORCES, AND CREATE HAVOC
FOR THE CONGO AND THE REGION. KABILA, HE SAID, HAD
EARLIER PROVIDED SOME ARMS TO THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE,
BUT THIS ARMS SUPPLY HAD BEEN LIMITED THANKS TO
ZIMBABWEAN INTERVENTION.

HOW ABOUT RESUPPLY AND TRAINING?

11. (C) WOLPE ASKED IF ZIMBABWE AND THE ALLIES MIGHT
BE ABLE, IN EXCHANGE FOR A DISENGAGEMENT INITIATIVE
BY RWANDA AND UGANDA, TO AT LEAST INSURE THE
CESSATION OF TRAINING AND RESUPPLY OF THE NON-
SIGNATORY FORCES. MNANGAGWA INITIALLY RESPONDED THAT
THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO MANAGE, AND
THAT ZIMBABWE HOPED THAT CHILUBA AND MASIRE COULD
ASSIST THE PARTIES "IN TALKING ACROSS THE LINES."
SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, MNANGAGWA SAID THAT HE
BELIEVED A COMMITMENT TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND
RESUPPLY COULD IN FACT BE MADE BY THE ALLIES TO
UGANDA AND RWANDA.

MASIRE AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 03 OF 05 212004Z

12. (C) WOLPE TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF MASIRE AND
THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE, DESCRIBING THE EFFORTS
THE USG HAD BEEN MAKING TO GET KABILA TO UNDERSTAND
THAT HE COULD EMERGE IN A STRONGER POSITION BY FULLY
EMBRACING LUSAKA AND ACCEPTING MASIRE'S FACILITATION.
MNANGAGWA AGREED WITH WOLPE, AND SAID THAT ZIMBABWE
HAD MADE THE SAME POINT WITH THE CONGOLESE PRESIDENT.
HE SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT MASIRE ESTABLISH A
MORE PUBLIC PROFILE, AND THAT HE BE SEEN TO BE
ACTIVELY CONSULTING WITH ALL OF THE REGIONAL

CAPITALS.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

113. (C) WHEN ASKED BY S/E WOLPE WHAT MESSAGE HE COULD CARRY FROM HARARE TO RWANDA AND UGANDA, THE JUSTICE MINISTER REPLIED: "THAT ZIMBABWE IS ANXIOUS TO SEE A CONCLUSION TO THIS WAR." MNANGAGWA OBSERVED THAT RWANDA AND UGANDA WOULD NO DOUBT SAY THE SAME THING. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE: "BECAUSE

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CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3114

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
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P 211945Z APR 00
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5812
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY LUANDA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
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DISARMAMENT WITH MUGABE CONFIDANT

ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA ARE SERIOUSLY WORKING ON A WAY TO PULL OUT." "BUT," HE CONTINUED, "ZIMBABWE CAN NOT GIVE AWAY THEIR GAME TO RWANDA AND UGANDA. THEY HAVE TO BE PULLING OUT AS WELL, AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS NEEDED ON THE GROUND TO SHINE A BRIGHT LIGHT ON ALL THE PLAYERS' ACTIONS AND BE AN IMPARTIAL WITNESS." HOW THE WITHDRAWAL IS STRUCTURED CAN BE WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIPS. IN FACT, MNANGAGWA SAID, A ZIMBABWE MILITARY TEAM HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO MBUJI-MAI TO BEGIN OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR A PULLOUT FROM THE DRC. WHILE THIS WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO BE VETTED AND APPROVED BY THE TOP MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, THEY HAD STARTED THE BALL ROLLING. THE JUSTICE MINISTER CONCLUDED: IF THERE ARE PROBLEMS ONCE THE UN FORCES ARE ON THE GROUND, IT WILL BE FROM RWANDA AND UGANDA, NOT FROM ZIMBABWE.

THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z

114. (C) AS PART OF HIS OVER-ALL PROGNOSIS, THE JUSTICE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT SOUTH AFRICA MAY NOW BE IN A POSITION TO PLAY "A MORE NEUTRAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE" ROLE IN THE CONGOLESE CONFLICT. MNANGAGWA SAID THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD BEEN PUSHING KABILA TO DISTINGUISH SOUTH AFRICA AND MBEKI FROM MANDELA, WHOM KABILA NEVER LIKED. "WE WANT KABILA TO OPEN HIS HEART TO MBEKI," HE SAID. MBEKI, HE ADDED,

HAD SO FAR PLAYED IT VERY WELL WITH KABILA.

NO TO REGIONAL SANCTIONS

115. (C) WOLPE ASKED THE JUSTICE MINISTER WHETHER THE LUSAKA SIGNATORIES HAD CONSIDERED THE IMPOSITION OF REGIONAL SANCTIONS ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATORS. MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. IT WAS FAR BETTER AT WORKING AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE AMONG THE PARTIES.

IS THERE A PLAN B?

116. (C) WOLPE ASKED MNANGAGWA IF ZIMBABWE AND THE ALLIES HAD ANY PLAN B IN MIND, SHOULD KABILA IN THE END PROVE WHOLLY IMPERVIOUS TO THE PRESSURES THAT WERE BEING APPLIED? THE JUSTICE MINISTER RESPONDED
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HARARE 02198 04 OF 05 212004Z
WITH A SMILE: "THIS IS A DANGEROUS QUESTION." IN ANY EVENT, HE CONTINUED, KABILA APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, AND "WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH HIM." HOWEVER, "KABILA SEES ZIMBABWE AS AN ALLY THAT HAS TAKEN OVER A DANGEROUS PROPORTION OF THE DRC'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THIS MAKES HIM UNCOMFORTABLE." MNANGAGWA ADDED THAT RECENTLY THE ALLIES HAD INSISTED THAT KABILA AGREE THAT ALL FAC FORCES WOULD OPERATE ONLY UNDER CENTRAL COMMAND. HOWEVER, KABILA REJECTED THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHICH IS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED IN THREE PROVINCES; KINSHASA, ORIENTALE AND KATANGA.

MORE USG SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY IS NEEDED

117. (C) WOLPE ASKED IF THE USG COULD BE HELPFUL IN STRENGTHENING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ZIMBABWE, ON THE ONE HAND, AND RWANDA AND UGANDA, ON THE OTHER. MNANGAGWA RESPONDED THAT ZIMBABWE HAD GOOD LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH BOTH RWANDA AND UGANDA, BUT THEY WERE INTENTIONALLY BEING KEPT TO A LOW LEVEL FOR THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3116

PAGE 01 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z
ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	DINT-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-01	OIGO-02
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	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00

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P 211945Z APR 00
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NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 HARARE 002198

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z
STATE FOR AF A/S SUSAN RICE, DAS POWELL, AF/S, AF/E,
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE AND SODERBERG,
USUN/W/BOBORR
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MOMENT. HOWEVER, ONCE THE DECISION WAS TAKEN, THERE
COULD BE AN EXPLOSION OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT AND
COMMUNICATION. THIS WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM.
HOWEVER, WHAT WOULD HELP NOW IS IF THE USG WOULD
ENGAGE IN MUCH MORE FREQUENT SHUTTLE BETWEEN THE
CAPITALS OF KINSHASA AND HARARE, BETWEEN KABILA AND
MUGABE..

COMMENT

18. (C) THE REMARKABLE CANDOR OF THE JUSTICE
MINISTER -- NOTING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO LUSAKA
IMPLEMENTATION OF DDRR; ACKNOWLEDGING HIS OWN
DISCUSSIONS WITH, AND REFLECTIONS ABOUT, THE EX-
FAR/INTERHAMWE; AND DESCRIBING ZIMBABWE'S DIFFICULT
RELATIONSHIP WITH KABILA -- IS TESTIMONY TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HARARE 02198 05 OF 05 212004Z
ZIMBABWE'S URGENT NEED TO FIND A QUICK WAY OUT OF THE
DROC. KABILA'S REJECTION OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION ON DDRR REMAINS A MAJOR HURDLE TO LUSAKA
IMPLEMENTATION. IN THE VIEW OF MNANGAGWA, THIS COULD
BEST BE ADDRESSED THROUGH BROADER INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. THE ELEMENTS OF AN INITIAL
DEAL COULD BE IN THE MAKING, THOUGH, IF THE
ZIMBABWEANS WOULD BE WILLING AT SOME POINT TO COMMIT
JOINTLY WITH THEIR ALLIES TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND
RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERHAMWE.

19. (C) PARTICULARLY STRIKING WAS MNANGAGWA'S
REQUEST THAT THE USG ENGAGE IN MORE ACTIVE AND
CONTINUOUS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, SPECIFICALLY BETWEEN
KABILA AND HIS OWN BOSS, MUGABE. IT WOULD APPEAR
ALSO THAT ZIMBABWE'S COMFORT LEVEL WITH SOUTH AFRICA
HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH MBEKI'S ASSUMPTION
OF THE PRESIDENCY. ZIMBABWE'S LEANING ON KABILA TO
ACCEPT A SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE MAY ULTIMATELY MAKE IT
POSSIBLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO PLAY A MORE SUBSTANTIVE
ROLE IN DROC PEACEKEEPING. END COMMENT.

MCDONALD

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